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ABSTRACT. In this paper I shall discuss my experiences of referring to Novalis in 
the context of Maori postcolonialism and metaphysical philosophy. As with other 
methods of research, from a Maori perspective one always alights on and then carries
the effects of the philosopher that stands behind the method, whether the philos-
opher is silent or explicit. This important onto-epistemological interaction, in a
general sense, acknowledges for the indigenous person that one is always ‘within’ 
the world and not detached from it. The maligned dead white male hence unavoid-
ably becomes the highly constructive, living impulse behind what is to become fresh
and innovative indigenous thinking.
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1. Introduction
Despite the growth of indigenous anti-colonial writing, one feature remains 
to be contemplated: the place of the Western theorist in that writing. One
could argue, on the assumption that the indigenous self is located in writing, 
that every indigenous writer is engaging tacitly with someone from the West
by virtue of the ontological nature of writing itself. Sustained and explicit
use of a philosopher from the West, however, carries its own risks because, 
as some indigenous and postcolonial writers, such as Pihama1 and Maffie2
have indicated, the dead white male may either prescribe an acceptable
field of discussion (which may not benefit Maori communities) or may be 
overtly racist towards the non-Western other. Or, more insidiously, their very
existence might impose both racist and prescriptive colonising forces onto 
the text.
In this article, I present my work, as a Maori theorist, with the German 
Romantic poet and 18th century philosopher Novalis in an articulation of a 
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Maori colonized metaphysics. Although he resonates naturally with some 
Maori metaphysics, Novalis is not without his difficulties. While he har- 
monizes with Maori notions of mystery and uncertainty and thus disdains 
the full force of rationalism, he simultaneously imbues the Other with overly 
spiritual and romantic qualities. I argue that this latter tendency, along with 
his unavoidable involvement with the West, may imbed itself imperceptibly 
but deeply in his method of ‘sentences that push’, a concept I used in my 
PhD thesis as I attempted to remain free of what was Western in his influ- 
ence. In this way, vestiges of Novalis remain even though I have apparently 
dispensed with him in my Maori theorizing. This inescapable feature of my 
engagement with his thinking signals another concern that must be taken 
into account by a Maori/Western method of encounter and may exemplify 
the sheer ubiquity of the dead white male in colonization generally. What 
remains for the indigenous writer is the importance of retaining both polit- 
ical and philosophical awareness – a retention that, to be sure, should be 
the practice of the indigenous writer or researcher in any context.  
 
2. The Romanticism of Novalis 
 
Novalis is not well known at all in the Anglo-American world of philosophy. 
The reasons for this are well beyond the scope of this article, but one of 
them may be baldly stated as follows: English-speaking philosophical studies 
have overwhelmingly preferred the analytic tradition, which pursues a clear, 
systematic description of a grounding proposition.3 Carnap and Heidegger’s 
well-known battle over the merit of metaphysics and logic respectively is at 
the front of the joust between analytic and continental approaches,4 and is 
often cited as the clearest drawing of the battle lines. Much earlier than this 
disagreement Carlyle5 had identified in his discussion about Novalis that 
German philosophy, unlike that of the English, had no problems with mys- 
ticism, showing that the divide was already tacitly, if not expressly, manifest. 
Calls for the two fields to reconcile6 are becoming increasingly insistent, 
though the German Romantics and that Movement’s students remain clear 
that a poetic representation of things in the world is key to a proper under- 
standing of them. Thus Novalis, falling unequivocally on the side of the 
continental philosophers, is often taken to be poet simpliciter7 by the ana- 
lytics, but with his ability to “grapple … with the difficulties involved in 
conceiving the self’s relationship to itself as a form of knowledge”8 is more 
likely to be both poet and philosopher in Germany. In direct synchronicity 
with his poetic enterprise was his cautious use of first empirical principles 
to ‘romanticize’ the world, by which he meant: 
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Die Welt muß romantisirt werden. So findet man den urspr[üng- 
lichen] Sinn wieder…. Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen 
Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein geheimnißvolles Ansehn, dem 
Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen 
unendlichen Schein gebe so romantisire ich es – Umgekehrt ist die 
Operation für das Höhere, Unbekannte, Mystische, Unendliche 
– dies wird durch diese Verknüpfung logarythmisirt.  
 
I give the general a higher sense, the usual a mysterious look, 
the well-known the dignity of the unknown, the finite an infinite 
appearance, I am romanticizing it – The converse operation is for 
the lofty, unknown, mystical, infinite – they are logarythmized 
by this association.9  
 
This fragment most succinctly expresses the approach of the Romantics to 
rationalism. Novalis saw the romanticizing project as acting in concert with 
the Absolute and not merely as aesthetic. The Absolute, or Being, arranged 
things in the world in a rational manner (rational in that it organized 
according to its own inconceivable plan). Things in the world, including 
ideas, could become banal through their overuse or through an overriding 
subjectivity. The ‘higher sense’ involved making that mundane thing poetic. 
A thing in the world, thus romanticized, retained to itself its own integrity 
through its mystery and incomprehensibility in the presence of this activity 
that Novalis called Being/the Absolute.10 Novalis’ mission may therefore 
be thought of as much political as it is philosophical. It represents an 
attempt to try and conceive of the Absolute cognitively and with certainty 
would be akin to trying to grasp “doch eine Handvoll Finsterniß” (“a hand- 
ful of darkness”)11 – a delusional and highly detrimental approach because 
it acts against the imperative of the metaphysics of Being.   
 
3. Novalis: Traits of the Dead White Male 
 
It will be Novalis’ membership with Western theorists and theory, I suspect, 
that raises the suspicion of many indigenous writers. As with other Western 
theorists, the danger of Novalis’ writings is in their potential to undermine 
Maori expression, both epistemologically and ontologically. This is an 
important issue to consider because the history of colonizing writing, in such 
disciplines as anthropology, has consistently rejected the potential vitality 
of Maori text.12 Crucial here is that the culpability of the dead white male 
appears to lie on two fronts: first, that he has contributed to a field of 
thought that has denied an indigenous explanation for existence; and second, 
that he has constructed a way of thinking about indigenous thought that only 
replicates and self-affirms his perceived superiority. One major concern 
that Maori writer Walker has about Western theory is that it has only ever 
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served the interests of a small group that has never had indigenous peoples 
as its concern. Indeed, for Sheilagh Walker, the dead white male “created
and perpetuated European philosophical discourse … for the benefit of other
White Males”.13 Contextualized, this comment is explainable through a
glance at such apparently objective disciplines as anthropology, which has 
defined indigenous peoples as objects of study.14 The positioning of Maori 
as curious, measurable entities resulted in spurious theories around intel-
ligence and development, for example. The actors in this and other scien-
tific and empirical fields were overwhelmingly “certain European men”15
who continued to “form … and fabricate … whiteness as a subject”; they 
would build on Hume’s and Beattie’s condescendingly racist attitude towards
non-whites,16 and the alleged dearth of philosophy among those peoples, and
be added to by Husserl who similarly believed that there could logically be 
no such thing as non-Western philosophy.17
Some more specific accusations, however, can be leveled at Novalis than
merely that comprising an incidence of association. Central to a criticism of 
Novalis is his interest in the ancient ‘Morgenländer’, or Oriental, that
similarly fascinated Herder but would be scorned by Hegel.18 His novel
“Henry von Ofterdingen”19 is largely constructed around the poet Heinrich’s
encounters with other exotic cultures, with Heinrich (Henry) hoping that
those groups will point the way towards a more authentic mode of poetic
representation. Some readers will at this juncture be reminded of the un-
comfortably naïve ‘romanticizing’ of the other that has been written about 
extensively as a mode of engagement with indigenous peoples,20 particularly
in fragments to do with such fantastic and unknown countries as Arabia.
With these sorts of fragments – and they are not uncommon throughout
“Henry von Ofterdingen” – one could be forgiven in thinking that Novalis 
was too wistful about the other, to the extent that the other became a mere 
archetype. Just as outrageously, the country of the other is apparently there 
as a respite from something that is part of Heinrich’s arduous existence.
The Morgenland itself is romantic and has the potential to save the German 
poet, who at the time of writing was thoroughly disillusioned by the domi-
nance of the French. Novalis’ characters often undertake forays into foreign
lands in search for authenticity and in a certain sense this was a necessary 
sojourn to discover a “unified body of human knowledge.”21 This search for
a universal epistemology was, to be sure, a Romantic concern in general, 
and admittedly the romanticized other and his/her land was thought of as its 
repository. Although Novalis does not fully fit the label of white ethnog-
rapher – he does value something inherent to the other’s culture and allows 
them an epistemology even more serious than his own – he is guilty of
attributing overly spiritual, fantastical qualities to the non-Western ‘other’.
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There is more to Novalis than this, however, and his own paradoxical 
belief that one cannot find the ultimate in the other must quickly be acknowl- 
edged. Novalis’ essentialism as I have described it may not be anthro- 
pological in the sense of Broeck’s description, but it is highly exoticizing. 
Simply because it is unscientific and poetic does not make his exoticism any 
more beneficent. Descriptions of the ‘childlike-albeit-superior other’ threaten 
to lock the other into a place of certainty. My objection to this fixed regard 
that Novalis sometimes employs engages both with the consequences for 
the other as well as his own philosophy. For the question must be raised: 
how can Novalis plausibly sustain a project of mystery when he roman- 
ticizes the other as exotic? A certain volte-face that Novalis performs in his 
“Die Lehrlinge zu Sais”, in which he stresses the journey for authenticity 
rather than its actual discovery in the other, may partly alleviate this 
concern. In “Die Lehrlinge”, the Absolute tantalizes the seeker of poetic 
truth onwards, but it will never be found elsewhere apart from within.22 
The protagonist Hyazinth finds that the true source of poetic authenticity is 
to be found as an aspect of himself, but only because of the workings of the 
Absolute and of nature. This imperfect reflection of the outside world within 
would lead Novalis to state that the world as a whole is to be read as an 
extension of the poetic self and that poetry is the “intentional, active, pro- 
ductive employment of our organs.”23 Thus the childishness that Novalis 
attributes to the other is already there in the self, if only the self knew it. It 
is closer to the truth that the potential for the authentic poetic self to be 
realized exists, but that if the poet feels they have to undertake circuitous 
journeys including the other, then so be it. We see here, then, Novalis’ 
ambiguity towards the other. On the one hand, the other contains something 
that his society did not at his time of writing, while on the other, his com- 
munity has that authenticity at a deep level but needs to resort to the other 
to be reminded of its presence.  
Given the problems for Maori that, among others, Husserl, Hume, and 
even Novalis, pose, it is difficult to see their use in indigenous thought. Yet 
some writers do indeed see a tentative approach. In more moderate fashion 
than Walker, Pihama states “I have no intention of adhering to an academic 
addiction that promotes ongoing injections of work from ‘dead white men’”24 
but she is not prepared to completely disregard this group, acknowledging 
that its members have made certain contributions. She rightly adds that most 
of them “have absolutely no understanding of how Māori experience the 
world, or the complex cultural relationships that are a part of our experi- 
ences”. Her caveat here suggests that they may step in at certain points in 
Maori writing but that they should not be relied on to explain a con- 
textualized Maori reality. Hall25 argues that the only reason certain of these 
men have become familiar to non-Western intellectuals – he names Plato, 
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Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Austin and Quine – is their natural
uptake through globalization, and identifies that it is problematic to refer to 
them when discussing Chinese philosophies around ‘truth’ because they
originate from a thoroughly other tradition which can only roughly ap-
proximate the depth of Chinese phenomenological thought. Maffie briefly 
discusses the dangers inherent to his own method of referring to Nahua
metaphysics hermeneutically: he states that “Approaching Nahua philosophy
in these terms is not without hazard”26 and that “employing [Western
philosophers] must not mislead us into thinking that Nahua philosophy con-
ceived philosophy in precisely these [fragmented] terms”. These descrip-
tions of Western philosophers include that they may prove helpful in cer-
tain undefined ways, especially if a critique of them takes place to begin
with so that the indigenous writer is aware of their limitations. 
I now turn more specifically to my own work with Novalis, keeping the 
above cautionary descriptions in mind whilst describing how he became so 
fundamental to how I articulated a Maori notion of Being.
4. My Free Thinking in the Realm of Novalis’ Provocations
4.1. The Problem of Highly Systematic Thinking for Indigenous Writers
The dead white male may also represent a much more amorphous problem 
– the arena of rational thought which indigenous writers are forced to
cooperate with, and in which Novalis deliberately does not participate. As 
Pihama and Maffie have respectively highlighted, the challenge for the
indigenous writer engaged in philosophizing involves avoiding being fixed 
by the Western individual. The ‘European philosophical discourse’ that we 
have seen Walker allude to is one that critical indigenous writers are aware 
of, and is characterized in the first instance by a ground of thinking from
which indigenous writers are not allowed to stray. In this process, highly 
cognitive and rational descriptions are privileged and add to the supremacy 
of that discourse. A highly systematic process of thought follows and must 
be adhered to. Such a rigid representation of things in the world was not one
privileged in traditional Maori society and indeed in some contemporary
contexts. To begin with, the Maori term ‘whakaaro’, which is often taken 
as ‘to think’, means “to cast attention to”27 which is not “the actual process 
of rational thought”. With this more phenomenological notion of the act of 
thinking, various terms step in that convey a sense of provocation for the
thinker, including ‘kupu whakaaro’ (a word or term that incites the thinker 
to respond), kupu whakakoaro (signifying a response to a word with a view 
to overturning a conventional approach), and kupu ohorere (the immediate 
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prickly or provocative sense that accompanies a proposition). It is believed 
that learners responded anew to a problem through provocation28 and that, 
in political and more current contexts, “indigenous elders can do wonderful 
things with an interview. They tell stories, tease, question, think, observe, 
tell riddles, test and give trick answers. Conversely, they can also expect
that an indigenous researcher will do the same back to them.”29
For the indigenous writer, thinking and writing so that the cognitive
process is untethered from other things in the world is problematic. It
ensures that the strictures of a paradigm not of those writers’ making are
sustained. Moreover, that paradigm is vastly different to that of indigenous 
thought. Linda Smith states in relation to kaupapa Maori theory:
… there is more to kaupapa Māori than our history under
colonialism or our desires to restore rangatiratanga. We have a 
different epistemological tradition that frames the way we see 
the world, the way we organize ourselves in it, the questions we 
ask, and the solutions we seek.30
Little Bear more broadly fleshes out the tradition Smith speaks of. He notes, 
against the truth seeking of the Socratic Greeks, that Aboriginal thought
right down to its linguistic characteristics sought to convey the fluidity of 
the world through its “verb-rich languages that are process- or action-
oriented language.”31 The challenge here for the indigenous writer lies in
presenting this orientation towards fluidity of a particular term as well as 
acknowledging the finite nature of things in the world. 
Yet the Western academic tradition does not easily permit this approach, 
either to discrete terms or to a view of language generally. Trenchant crit-
icism comes from those indigenous writers who have identified Descartes 
in particular as invalidating an indigenous worldview that is not so cog-
nitive or rational. Descartes (rightly or wrongly) occupies pride of place as 
the identified antagonist of holism, even if he never had indigenous meta-
physics in his sights. Largely the critique lies in the way Descartes posits
the subject in relation to the rest of the world. Oskal points out that crucial 
to Descartes’ epistemology is the ability of the perceiving self to turn away 
from “the outside world”32 and towards the more rarefied world of inner
representation. Given that the origin of indigenous thinking is the outside
world, this is likely to be a dangerous activity, or at the very least it rep-
resents an undesirable move – a step away from the all-important con-
nections to the outside world33 that other indigenous peoples assert are all-
important. Descartes’ dichotomy of mind and body has moreover been seen 
as a source of ill-health.34 Even the apparently banal act of reading and
writing is not free of Descartes’ influence, helping as it did to abstract the 
thing being discussed from the self through the alphabet.35
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The inevitable outcome of a preference for a Cartesian representation of 
things in the world is the exclusion of what indigenous peoples have always 
traditionally valued. For the Maori writer, it means that a non-Maori view 
of the world is easily sustained. It then happens that certain issues of 
importance to Maori cannot be addressed. Simmonds expands on the detri- 
mental effects of acceptable theory, stating that it has established a field of 
orthodoxy, outside of which lies the realm of mere myth and nonsense. 
Indigenous ways of thinking were supplanted by these strict criteria and, 
moreover, the notion of strict criteria itself became important. This deep 
philosophical entrenchment, it seems, is not circumventable as it lies at the 
basis of how, for instance, Maori spirituality is now viewed. Simmonds 
continues thus: 
 
The marginalisation of wairua persisted and continues today. 
Māori spirituality is commonly described as symbolic and not 
real. While scientific knowledge is given credibility, almost un- 
problematically, discourses premised on the spiritual are lumped 
with the burden to prove their validity.36  
 
Simmond’s announcement that a field of thought has threatened a tradi- 
tional Maori one is perhaps closer to the truth of the impact of the West 
than are any assertions about specific individuals and their respective in- 
fluences. As a suggestion that emphasizes the development of Western 
philosophy as a whole and its dominance over indigenous peoples, it 
conjoins more with a ‘hidden’ aspect of the West and its continued impact 
on indigenous thought. Individuals do not declare themselves in the prob- 
lem. Stewart therefore indicates about Western knowledge that it involves 
“compartmentalisation”;37 one can infer here that it is the knowledge itself 
that is at issue rather than any individual/s as such. Against the non-
dichotomous process of categorization in indigenous languages38 is pitted a 
language that attempts to make specific distinctions, leading to (or orig- 
inating in) an equally disparate language that threatens indigenous world- 
views.  
 
4.2. Novalis’ Method of Provocation  
       and Its Opposition to the Strong Self 
 
His undeniable exoticism notwithstanding, somewhat surprisingly Novalis 
may be at his most helpful in his critique of the strongly placed self in 
rational thinking. His method for moving towards a more metaphysically 
and politically transformative approach to things in the world is equally 
important. Novalis does not deal explicitly with Descartes, but he sustainedly 
attends to the philosophical arguments of Johann Georg Fichte. Fichte, an 
Idealist who, having an even more nihilistic attitude than Descartes towards 
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objects in the world that are the not-I, proposed that the activity of the self 
is the “pure act of thinking as such.”39 Fichte was probably influenced by 
Descartes,40 and attempts to banish Kant’s ‘thing in itself’ by proposing a 
single principle from which all knowledge originates, and it is this focus on 
cognitive knowledge as a self-originating process that Novalis takes aim at 
in his method for encouraging others to think in line with the Absolute. 
Avoiding this tightly prescribed parameter of thinking is as important for 
Novalis as it is for those indigenous thinkers who take Descartes to task, 
and compelled by his concern he steps in as a provocateur, rather than a 
dictator, of thought. To that general extent, he echoes others in the Roman- 
tic Movement such as the Schlegel brothers, who proposed that “[d]ie 
romantische Dichtart … allein ist unendlich, wie sie allein frei ist und das 
als ihr erstes Gesetz anerkennt” (“the Romantic style of poetry … is on its 
own as being as unending as it is free”).41 We see him both deal with the 
implicit solipsism of both Descartes and Fichte and observe him make a 
proclamation about thinking that would lay the foundation for my own 
theoretical method in my doctorate:  
 
Die Darst[ellung] der Philosophie besteht demnach aus lauter 
Themas, Anfangssätzen – Unterscheidungssätzen – bestimmten 
Stoßsätzen – Sie ist nur für Thätige, für Wahrheitliebende da – 
die analytische Ausführung des Themas ist nur für Träge oder 
Ungeübte – denen die Mutter erst fliegen, und sich in einer 
bestimmten Direction erhalten, lernen muß. 
 
The exposition [Darstellung] of philosophy consists, therefore, 
merely in themes, first sentences – certain sentences that push 
[Stoßsätze] – the exposition exists only for active lovers of the 
truth. The analytical elaboration of the theme is for slow or 
unskilled ones, those whom the mother first needs to teach how 
to fly, and how to maintain a certain direction.42  
 
Novalis’ idiosyncratic method was an important one in my own theorizing 
around a Maori notion of mystery and ontology, and is linked with his 
general disdain for systematic philosophy that required stepping the thinker 
through to a predetermined end. Thoughts to him are “Bewegungen und 
Actionen” (“movements and actions”)43 and are to be encouraged but not 
confined to a final philosophical system, which, as we have seen, for him 
was an analytical one. Thus thinking is a creative and ongoing exercise 
and, importantly, was not solely cognitively derived but also emotional. 
This crucial proviso is reflected in his belief that sentences that push should 
sometimes be as much awkward for the reader as they should sit snugly 
within the reader’s comfort zone. Thinking here is not so much human 
centered as it is a result of a confluence of objects’ and the Absolute’s 
movements. The perceiver apprehends those movements and is, in turn, 
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compelled to think. The proposition, sentence or fragment that Novalis 
extends to the thinker hence acts in tandem with other impetuses that bring 
about a reaction for the self. 
In the case of both Novalis’ and Maori discourses, there is the potential 
for a thought or perception of an object to be transformed through the 
method of provocation. Novalis, overtly distancing himself from the more 
systematic proposals of Fichte, is of tremendous help to the indigenous 
thinker who does not want to be imprisoned by what Novalis himself called 
the “versteinerte Zauberstadt” (“petrified, enchanted city”)44 of scientized 
systems. However, one must allow for the possibility that one’s own cog- 
nitive approach is not all that is at work. Thinking qua unpredictable act is 
important for Novalis, as we can see in the continuation of his assertion 
about the sentence that pushes: 
 
Hemsterhuis hat hier eine herrliche Stelle vom Geist und Buch- 
staben der Philosophie.... Nach ihm ist der Buchstabe nur eine 
Hülfe der philosophischen Mittheilung – deren eigentliches 
Wesen im Nachdenken besteht. Der Redende leitet nur den 
Gang des Denkens im Hörenden – und dadurch wird es zum 
Nachdenken. Er denkt – und der Andre denkt nach. Die Worte 
sind ein unzuverlässiges Medium des Vordenkens. Die ächte 
Wahrheit muß ihrer Natur nach, wegweisend seyn. Es kommt 
also nur darauf an jemand auf den rechten Weg zu bringen, 
oder besser, ihm eine bestimmte Richtung auf die Wahrheit zu 
geben. Er gelangt dann von selbst, wenn er anders thätig ist, 
begierig, zur Wahrheit zu gelangen, an Ort und Stelle. 
 
Hemsterhuis has a wonderful passage on spirit and letter in 
philosophy…. According to him the letter is merely a help for 
philosophical communication – the true essence of which con- 
sists in after-thinking [Nachdenken]. The speaker merely leads 
the direction of thought in the hearer – and thereby it becomes 
after-thinking. He thinks and the other thinks after him. Words 
are an untrustworthy medium of fore-thinking [Vordenken]. 
The genuine truth must, according to its nature, show the way. 
Therefore, the only thing that matters is sending someone onto 
the right road, or better, giving him a certain direction towards 
the truth. He will then get there automatically, if only he is 
active, desiring, to get to the truth.45 
 
At the forefront of Novalis’ argument is a vital feature of Romantic belief 
that the reader may have already discerned: that thinking becomes less about 
the tightly enclosing field of rationalistic permission and more constituted 
by mystery. Informed by Novalis, thought for the Maori person here ceases 
to be constrained by any parameters. Chance itself, and all it engenders 
with the unknown, comes to bear on how the Maori writer will negotiate 
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Novalis’ sentences, and the after-thinker (to translate literally from the 
German) is drawn into ever new articulations that appear to have no finality 
(they are characterized by ‘free concatenation’).  
 
4.3. My Use of Novalis’ ‘Sentences that Push’: Some Reflections 
 
Novalis’ sentences/fragments allowed me to retain my own Maori voice 
while provoking me to think about colonization and metaphysics. More 
than this, his cautiously critical regard of rationalism threw light on where 
the world has grown rigid for Maori through colonization. It is at the anti-
rational edge that poesy occupies that Novalis has the greatest value for the 
Maori writer, for to be poetic is to possess a greater creative and political 
insight into Being. His fragments generally encouraged me to think about 
the ways in which a Platonic metaphysics of permanence and visibility 
operates for Maori where it may not have traditionally. A hallmark of 
rationalism for Novalis, unrelenting light in scholarship (in the sense of 
‘throwing light on’ a problem) catches a ‘thing’ – concrete or abstract 
entity, including the self – in its glare. That thing then loses its fluidity – or, 
in Novalis’ language, it needs to rediscover its “potent single word”46 that 
will once again bring light and dark together again. This provocation alone 
compelled me to consider how a Maori regard for things in the world 
threatened to be ‘hardened’ to the point of fitting a scientized worldview. I 
was sent off by his fragments on a line of thinking that ostensibly did not 
carry any of his own thinking in it. I could therefore suggest how Maori 
have been historically encouraged to conceive of the highly apparent as 
truthful through the colonizing practices of dominant institutions such as 
law, health and education, and could refer to his fragments to incite me to 
consider how those most fundamental modes of expression – Maori terms – 
could be reconfigured to fit with a constant reference to the Absolute.47 
Novalis refuses to foreclose my own thinking. He did insist that I con- 
sider the role of the Absolute/Being in any representation of things in the 
world, but this desideratum should not be a foreign one for the indigenous 
writer in any case. The outcome of my thinking, so Novalis would have it, 
is Maori in nature, although he provides me with signposts for that process. 
At most a word of caution, at least a neutral comment, is due at this point 
for other Maori writers who believe they have happened upon a helpful 
Western source, and it is here that I add another possible worry to those of 
the indigenous writers above. Novalis himself seems to suggest that any 
contact with anything else results in an enduring effect of that thing, even 
when that thing appears to have been discarded or is now absent. One’s 
transformation of the world continues even when one is not aware of it, but 
even more importantly something persists. A response to a sentence that 
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pushes might be thought of as entirely new and creative, and indeed it 
probably will not resemble that sentence in an epistemic sense, but there is 
always an ontological presence of what spurred it on to begin with. Perhaps 
disturbingly for some, it has not gone away. The suggestion by Novalis that 
there are shoots or geneses in a seed of thought that carry on even to full 
growth and simply remain48 clashes with empiricist belief that, if it is not to 
be sensed, then it simply does not exist. I argue that the permanent presence 
of the original sentence adds to the mystery of the consequent thought, 
because the outcome always contains primordial, often opaque, vestiges of 
its progenitor. To a large extent the enduring effect is linked to a character 
of language itself – that it is imbued with a power, beyond being a useful 
envelope of meaning. Some Maori writers49 imply that words themselves 
are animate; they could therefore well have an agency of their own that is 
dependent nevertheless on other entities and they could possess a ‘reach’ 
that moves onwards, beyond the sense perception of humans.  
I refer to language, ontology and mystery to highlight that Novalis’ 
urge to think in light of his sentences necessarily poses its own hypothetical 
challenges. My writing, as reflective on a Maori reality as it professes to 
be, may contain the vestiges of Novalis’ deep sense (his own preference for 
discussions about Being) in his thoughts, his historical context (including 
his exoticizing racism), and his engagement with a highly empirical world 
(despite his opposition to it). This ‘metaphysical baggage’ that is an in- 
evitable outcome of coming into contact with not just Novalis but any other 
theorist or discursive field is perhaps less of a problem when the philos- 
opher’s arguments are somehow harmonious with those of indigenous 
metaphysics – Novalis is to be included among those thinkers. However, if 
one were to use Descartes’ Meditations, for instance, from which to spring- 
board thought about an indigenous issue (such as, say, the relationship of 
the mind to the body), then the silence of that original source may in fact 
scream up through the outcome. In the writing of my doctorate, my constant 
camaraderie with Novalis may heighten that concern, with the result that what 
appears to be autonomous Maori thinking is imperceptibly ‘Novalian’. This 
problem may occur in any event for the indigenous writer who is not par- 
ticularly interested in consulting a Western philosopher; the act of writing 
itself is Western derived in its most fundamental sense,50 and Maori theoriz- 
ing is forced to engage with that hidden colonizing presence even when it 
remains hidden within writing. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Maori academic writer lives in exciting philosophical times, primarily 
because the deep impact of Western philosophy on Maori and the conse- 
 35 
quences of this for the theorist themselves have yet to be fully and sus- 
tainedly explored. Despite this potential, though, there exists here a real 
responsibility for the Maori theorist – to philosophise about the extent and 
reach of the potentially colonizing philosophies they are referring to. In this 
way, Maori philosophizing is as much an ethical issue as human subject 
research is. In my doctoral research I found Novalis, a Western philosopher, 
provided me with a method of provocation that allowed me to pursue a 
theory of Maori metaphysics with some degree of autonomy. In large part, 
the method was liberatory because it did not seek to confine an outcome, as 
the strictures of Western academic in their very operation often do for 
indigenous writers. However, I have been quick to point out that, regardless 
of the Western philosopher’s position in relation to Maori thought, the writer 
must be prepared for the continued presence of that compelling philosopher. 
This phenomenon is of dual significance for the Maori writer, who indeed 
may not have nothing against that continued presence but who nevertheless 
needs to be aware of its possibility. 
 
Glossary of Maori terms and phrases 
 
Kaupapa Maori – a Maori way of engaging with the world 
Kupu ohorere – provocation 
Kupu whakaaro – word or term that incites thinker to respond 
Kupu whakakoaro – a response to a word with a view to overturning conventional response 
Rangatiratanga – chieftainship; autonomy 
Wairua – spirit 
Whakaaro – to think; cast attention to. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Pihama 2001. 
2. Maffie 2005a. 
3. Levy 2003; Solomon 2003. 
4. Friedman 2000. 
5. Carlyle 1829. 
6. Bowie 1997. 
7. Kneller 2003. 
8. Larmore 2000, p. 141. 
9. The German quote is taken from Novalis 1960e, p. 545; the English quote is 
my own. 
10. Stone 2008. 
11. The German quote is taken from Novalis 1960c, p. 106; the English quote is 
my own. 
12. L. Smith 1999. 
13. Walker 1996, p. 26. 
14. L. Smith 1999; Broeck 2002. 
15. Broeck 2002, p. 826. 
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16. See for example Garrett 2000. 
17. Maffie 2005b. 
18. Germana 2007. 
19. Novalis 1990. 
20. See for instance Sardar, Nandy, and Davies 1993; L. Smith 1999; Hall 1997. 
21. Seyhan 1992, p. 15. 
22. Mika 2013a. 
23. Behler 1993, p. 203. 
24. Pihama 2001, p. 92. 
25. Hall 2001. 
26. Maffie 2005a, n.p. 
27. T. Smith 2000, p. 58. 
28. Hemara 2000. 
29. L. Smith 1999, p. 136. 
30. L. Smith 2000, p. 230. 
31. Little Bear 2000, p. 78. 
32. Oskal 2008, p. 337. 
33. Fagan 2008. 
34. Mobein 2011. 
35. Aranga, Mika and Mlcek 2008. 
36. Simmonds 2011, p. 15. 
37. Stewart 2007, p. 139. 
38. Little Bear 2000. 
39. Lindberg 2007, p. 249. 
40. Mandt 1997. 
41. The German quote is taken from Schlegel and Schlegel 1798, p. 30; the 
English quote is taken from Strich 1962, p. 358. 
42. The German quote is taken from Novalis 1960d, p. 374; the English quote is 
taken from Kleingeld 2008, p. 278. 
43. The German quote is taken from Novalis 1960b, p. 595; the English quote is 
my own. 
44. The German quote is taken from Novalis 1960b, p. 564; the English quote is 
my own. 
45. The German quote is taken from Novalis 1960d, pp. 373–374; the English 
quote is taken from Kleingeld 2008, p. 278. 
46. Dane 2011, n.p. 
47. Mika 2013a; Mika 2103b. 
48. Novalis 1960a. 
49. See for instance Pere 1982; Raerino 2000; Browne 2005. 
50. Aranga, Mika and Mlcek 2008. 
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